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Clyde  Kiker and Gary D.  Lynne
Increased  competition  and  conflict  among  users  water  rights  are  controlled  and  regulated.  Humid
of  water  have  caused  eastern  states  to  investigate  eastern  states
3 evolved  common  law doctrines,  while
alternatives  to  their  common  law  doctrines  dealing  the  arid  western  ones  adopted  a  prior-appropriation
with  water  use,  and  the  legislative  trend  is  toward  doctrine.  In addition,  several states chose to recognize
greater  state  administration  in  water management.  As  both  doctrines.
4
a  part  of  this  trend,  Florida  has  enacted  an  admin-  The  physically  abundant  water  supplies  of  the
istrative  water  law  (Florida  Water  Resource  Act  of  eastern  states  led  to  a  body  of  law  which  viewed
1972  [4])  based  upon  a  model  water  code  suggested  water  as  property-the  property  of  no  one  to  be
for  eastern  states  [11].  The  economic  efficiency  shared by everyone.  These are common  law doctrines.
implications  of  the  allocation  processes  allowed  by  Rights  to  navigable  waters  were  covered  in  the
the  code  and  the  Florida act  are  examined  herein  to  riparian  doctrine.  Owners  of  land  adjoining  a  navi-
indicate  how  more  effective  use  of  basic  economic  gable  lake  or  stream  are  entitled  to  the  full  natural
principles  could  increase  efficiency  of  water  alloca-  flow.  Others are  entitled  to  use  the waters  for fishing
tion  under  an  administrative  system.  Since  the  and  navigation.  Taken literally,  the doctrines preclude
present body-of-water  law  has evolved  over time  and  removing  water  from,  or  depositing  any  foreign
any  modifications  must  be consistent  with  this  body  substance  into, the  navigable  water.  The doctrine has
of  law,l  eastern  surface  and  groundwater  law  is  been  modified  through  case  law  over  time,  and
reviewed  first.  Then,  water  allocation  under  admin-  presently,  the  user may make  "reasonable use"  of the
istrative  water  law,  with  a  focus  on  the  code  and the  water  for  any  purpose  not  unduly  interfering  with
Florida water act, is discussed.  Alternative approaches  "reasonable  use"  of  other  riparian  land  owners
to  water  allocation  which  have  potential  for  improv-  [5,  12, 16].
ing economic efficiency  are  discussed last.2 The  groundwater  law of the  East also stems from
common  law  doctrines.  English  common  law  con-
sidered  groundwater  below an  individual's  land  to be
EASTERN WATER  LAW  absolutely  owned  by  him.  The  right  to  water  was
The  states  of the  Union  have evolved  systems of  based  on  a  rule  of  capture,  with  allocation  based
law  under  which  acquisition,  use  and  protection  of  simply  on  the amount one could pump. This doctrine
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New  statutes  modify many  aspects  of existing  water  law and  specific  parts will be ultimately tested  in the courts. It  is not
possible  to  foresee the  outcome  of these  cases,  but  it  is reasonable  for economists to attempt to understand the evolved law and
make suggestions that are not likely to conflict with this law.
2 The authors recognize  that a  substantial body  of literature  has been developed  around the relationship  between economics
of  water  allocation  and  the  western  prior-appropriation  doctrine.  Eastern  common law  water  doctrines  stem  from  an entirely
different legal basis and this relationship  has not been developed.
3Eastern states are considered  to be all states east  of,  and including, Minnesota,  Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana.
Federal  government  also  had  a large  influence,  through various  actions, on water use.  It  is useful for purposes of this paper,
however,  to limit the discussion  to state laws and their influence on water-use rights.
57worked  well  when  there  was  little  use  of  the  quantity  and  quality  problems.  The  Florida  act and
groundwater  [5,  12].  the  Model  Water  Code,  both  of  which  offer  an
As greater  use  (and  the resulting competition)  of  administrative  approach  to water rights allocation and
groundwater  arose,  two  other  doctrines  evolved;  regulation,  are cases  in point.5
namely,  the  reasonable  use  and  correlative  rights
doctrines.  The  reasonable  use  doctrine  allows  any
reasonable  use  of  groundwater  on  the  land  from  ADMINISTRATIVE  REGULATION
which  it  was  removed.  Water  may not be  taken  and  The  stated,  legal intent of statutory  regulation  of
used  on  lands  other  than  that  from  which  it  was  a  state's  water  resources  is  to  enhance  public  and
pumped.  The  landowner was  given  a  right to develop  private  water  rights  by  considering hydrologic  inter-
groundwater and land  without  regard to the external  relationships  of  all  types  of  water,  minimizing  un-
effect  that  might be  created  [5,  12].  The  correlative  certainty  (providing  security),  and  providing  flexi-
rights  doctrine  requires  landowners  to apportion  the  bility  that  will  allow  maximum  beneficial  use  of
common  groundwater  supply.  "Reasonableness,"  for  water  and  eliminate  waste  [11].  The  question  that
this  case,  is  the balance  of co-equal  and  co-extensive  arises  is:  What  are  the  implications  for  economic
rights of affected landowners  [5, 12].  efficiency  and distribution under administrative regu-
Conflicts  between  individuals  over  available  lation  with these objectives?  The administrative  struc-
supplies  of both surface  and groundwater  are settled  ture  outlined  in  the  code  and  implemented  in  the
by  civil  litigation  under  the  common  law  doctrine.  Florida administrative  system will serve as an example
With  ample  supplies and  low usage  of water  (such  as  in addressing this question.
in  eastern  states  until recent  time),  this approach  to  The  Florida  Water  Resources  Act  of  1972  de-
allocation  facilitated  adjustment  of  conflicts  among  dares  that " . . . all  waters  in the state are  subject to
users  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  each  and  regulation . . "  [4, Part  1, Sec. 4].6  To perform  this
dictates  of general  "public interests."  There  was little  regulation,  the  act  authorizes a  state water  plan and
interdependence  in  utility  and  production  function  establishes  a  two-tiered  state and local administrative
during  this  time.  The  doctrines  provided  each  land-  structure.  A  state  environmental  regulation  agency
owner  with  a degree  of flexibility which allowed  new  exercises  a  coordinating  and  planning  role,  while
uses  or  expansion  of  old  uses  in light  of  changing  actual  administration  at the  local  level  is assigned  to
conditions of water use and supply.  five  water management disctricts (hereinafter referred
As  populations  grew  and  society  become  more  to  as the  districts), established along hydrologic lines.
complex,  criticism  was  leveled  at  the  common  law  Stated  intent  of the act is to provide for management
doctrines  because  they  often  indirectly  prevented  of water  for efficient  use and conservation,  as well as
more  efficient  use  of  a  state's  water  resources.  for protection  of natural resources,  fish  and wildlife,
Economic  efficiency  is  not  necessarily  considered  in  and public health and welfare  [4].
common  law,  since  almost  all  uses  are  considered  The  heart  of  the  water  regulation  process  is  a
equally  valuable.  This  problem  is  compounded  be-  permit system administered  by the districts. There are
cause  the  doctrines  do  not  provide  for use  of water  two  types  of  permits,  regulatory  and  consumptive
on lands  other than  from which it originated.  A great  use.  Regulatory  permits provide control over physical
deal  of  uncertainty  is  created  for  the  user  as  the  modifications  of the water  resource  system  [4,  Parts
concept  of  reasonableness  changes  over  time  in  III  and  IV].  A  permit  of  the  consumptive  use type
response  to  case law.  Indeed,  extent of a landowner's  must  be  obtained  for  removal  of  water  from  all
right  of  reasonable  use  can  be  determined  only  by  sources  for all  uses  except  domestic  consumption  by
expensive  litigation,  often  of long duration,  and then  individuals.  Permits may  be  granted  for up to twenty
only  with  respect  to  the  other  litigant.  Growing  years  [4,  Part  II],  but at present  are being  given  for
concern  over  adequacy  of  the  common law case-by-  shorter  periods.  For  a  permit to  be  granted,  it must
case  approach  has  led  many  states  to  move  toward  be  established  that  the proposed use  is a "reasonable-
considering  statutory  means  for  dealing  with  water  beneficial  use," 7 will not interfere with any presently
5Several  western  states  (California,  Idaho,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  New  Mexico,  Oregon,  Utah,  Texas  and  Washington)  have
administrative  water  control agencies  empowered  by law to  handle the water  claims  of appropriators,  to  approve  or disapprove
transfers and to resolve conflicts; however, these have as their institutional roots western water law [6].
Waters  in  the  state  are  defined  as  "...any  and  all  water  on  or  beneath  the  surface  of  the  ground  or  in  the
atmosphere ...  as well as all coastal waters within the jurisdiction of the state .. ."  [4, Part I, Sec.  2 (9)].
7The  act  defines  "reasonable-beneficial  use"  as "  ..  .the use  of water  in such  quantities as is  necessary  for  economic and
efficient  utilization,  for  a purpose  and  in  a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest .. ." [4, Part
I, Sec.  2, (5)].
58existing  legal  use (a permitted  use),  and  is  consistent  transfer  occurs  [16,  p. 18].  Under this system, shifts
with  the "public  interest"  [4, Part  II,  Sec.  3 (1)].  In  from  "old"  to  "new"  uses  can  occur  only when  the
fact,  the  act  generally  emphasizes  what  it  terms  permit  terminates.  As  a  result,  as  soon  as  physical
public  interest  considerations.  For  example,  in  the  supplies  are  all  allocated  (all  rights  assigned),  eco-
case  of  water  shortages  (insufficient  water  to  meet  nomic  activities  having  higher  valued  uses  (if  any
permitted  quantities,  or  conditions  being  such  that  exist)  will be excluded.
water  use  should  be  reduced  to  protect  water  The  act  also  provides  little  information  on  how
resources  from  "serious  harm"),  the  Board  may  water  is  to  be  divided  in  a  water  shortage  or
impose  restrictions  in  light  of  the  "public  interest"  emergency.  A water  shortage  plan  is  to  be developed
[4,  Part  II,  Sec.  10  (3)].  As  such,  the  legislation  by  each district  [4]; the plan is  to include classifica-
appears  to  have  greatly  enhanced  public  rights  in  tion  of permits according  to source, method and  use.
determining  water allocations  [10].  The  question  is:  In  periods  of  water  shortage,  the  Board  may  order
How  will  private rights  fair under  the act?  The  act is  temporary  reduction  in  total  water  use,  impose
not  specific  as  to private  rights.8 The  districts  have,  restrictions  on  one  or more  classes  of permits,  make
however,  developed  criteria  for  giving  permits  to  changes  in conditions of an  individual's permit, place
private  users.  restrictions  on  his use  of water  or suspend  his permit
Generally  speaking,  the  water  permitting-  [4,  Part  II,  Sec.  10  (6)].  And,  in  the  case  of  an
allocation  procedure  is  currently  based  on  tech-  emergency  they  may  apportion,  rotate,  limit  or
nical  criteria.  The  recognized  "entitlement"  to  prohibit  the  use  of the  district's water  resources  [4,
water  is  related  to  the  long-run  availability  of  Part II, Sec.  10 (7)].
water  from  the  specific  source  (the  physical  There  is,  then,  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty
supply),  as  compared  to  the  amount  of  water  associated  with  an  individual's  right  to  water.
"required"  by  the  proposed  "reasonable"  use.  The  Whether  his  right  will  be  enhanced  or  diminished
following  example,  representative  of  the  approach  will  depend  upon  administrative  discretion.  This
for  an  agricultural  use  permit,  will  serve  to clarify,  has  caused  Trelease  [15]  to  conclude  that  the
A  producer  applies  for  a  groundwater  permit  code  has  substituted  administrative  uncertainty  for
to  irrigate  a  160-acre  citrus  grove.  The  district  the  legal uncertainties  of common law  doctrines.  His
determines  maximum  evapotranspiration  require-  comment is also apropos  to the Florida Water Act.
ment  for  the  crop  (i.e.,  the  optimum,  maximum
plant  growth  water  requirement).  His  "entitle-
ment"  becomes  either  (1)  the  quantity  of  water
annually  recharged  to  the  aquifer  from  all  his  ALTERNATIVE  WATER ALLOCATION
owned  land  (which  may  be  more  than  160  acres),  APPROACHES
or  (2) the  quantity  of  water  required  to  make  up  Water, as  a source  of service flows to private uses,
the  difference  between  evapotranspiration  and  does not lend itself readily to open market allocation,
average  precipitation.  The  producer  is  given  a  per-  because  (in  part)  of  the  substantial  public  service
mit  for  the  smaller  of  these  two  quantities,  as  flows  it  also provides.  In fact, under the common law
long  as  he  does  not  significantly  affect  surrounding  doctrines,  many  of  these  public  uses  precede  the
users  of  water  with  his  pumping  (externalities  are  rights  of  private  users.  While  the Florida administra-
banned).  Obviously,  there  are  no  economic  tive  system  places  public interest  foremost,  it uses  a
efficiency  principles  being  utilized  in  this technical  technical,  and  potentially  inefficient  (economically),
criterion.9 water  right  allocation  approach.  However,  there  are
The  act  is also  unclear with  regard to how use is  ways  to  modify  eastern  water  law  to  improve
to be  shifted  from "old"  to "new."  Current  practice  allocative efficiency.
by the  districts  ties the water right to land ownership  Assume  the  administrative  authority,  through
for a  certain  period of time (up to 20 years),  or until  some  type  of  broad  benefit-cost  calculus,  has  estab-
the  land is  transferred to another owner, whichever is  lished that  a given,  fixed flow of water in  a watershed
shorter.  The  right  is  extinguished  if  an  attempted  or  groundwater  basin  shall  be  allocated  in  a certain
8Wadley  [16,  p..  13],  in  a  legal  interpretation  of  the  act,  has  stated  that  although  riparian  rights  remain,  "...Any
consumptive  use  or  extraction  is  now  regulated  by  statute."  He  further  stated  that,  "Few,  if  any,  common  law  rights to
groundwater remain unaffected by the recent statute."
9As  a side  note,  present  value  of  a 10-year  permit for  the  160-acre  citrus grove  (using  a discount  rate of 10  percent)  is
$106,000  (based  on net returns to irrigation water of  $108.19  per acre per year as  estimated by  Renolds,  et al, [13]).  Current
practice involves  giving this permit for the cost  of an application fee.
59manner  such  as  to  satisfy  public  interest.'  The  Trelease  [15]  has  suggested  that  eastern  states
question  faced  by  the  authority  is how  to efficiently  use  the  administrative  structure presented  in the code
and  practically  allocate  remaining water rights among  in  conjunction  with  the  appropriation  doctrine  used
private  users.  Harl  [5]  and  Trelease  [15]  have  in  western  states.  He points out  that the  administra-
addressed  this question.  Their viewpoints  representing  tive  structure  in  the  code  will  adequately protect the
basic  approaches  typically  suggested  by  economists  resource,  the  environment  and  public  interest.  His
and  lawyers  are  discussed  below,  along  with  a  third  criticism  deals  with  provisions  for  private  rights  to
approach  we  feel has merit,  water.  Essentially,  he  is  arguing  for  greater  security
Harl  [5]  has  recommended  an  approach  for  and  flexibility  in  private  rights  to  water,  which  he
Iowa,  which  has  a  permit  system  [7]  similar to  the  believes the appropriation  doctrine  1 provides.
one  suggested  in  the  code.  Iowa's permit system does  There  are,  however,  several  aspects  of  the
not allow  free  transfer  of permits  and  thus precludes  appropriative  doctrine which  can  be  viewed  as objec-
allocation  of water rights in a market.  Harl noted that  tionable.  First,  if  water  is  interpreted  to  be  public
optimal  allocation  of  a  fixed  supply  among  inde-  property,  there  is  an  obvious  windfall  gain  to  the
pendent  productive  uses  occurs  at  the  point  where  superior  appropriators  when  a  right-to-water  is
value  of  the  marginal  product of  water in  all  uses  is  granted  in  perpetuity  [11].  As  demonstrated  in  the
equal  [5, p.  32a].  He  suggested  a  system  of  ad  citrus  grove  example,  this  windfall  gain can  be  quite
valorem  taxation  could  have  an  allocative  effect  large.  The  situation  is  further  aggravated  if  it  is
similar to a market system.  necessary  for  the  administrative  agency  to  recover
The  authors  find  Harl's recommendations  a  step  water  rights  to  protect  the  public's  interest;  they
in  the  right  direction,  but  have  reservations  about  must  purchase  back  the  rights  to  water  which  were
their  applicability  in  a  rapidly  changing  state  (like  granted  initially  for  no  charge.  Second,  groundwater
Florida).  The  approach  of  allocating  permits  at  the  has also  given  the western  states problems [9], and is
value  of the  marginal  product, for  example,  does not  likely  to do  so  in  the  East.  The  question  is: Who  is
deal  with  the  problem  of  time  dynamics  of  water  appropriating  what  water? There is no clearly defined
allocation.  Even  if this  rule is  used  to give  out initial  flow of groundwater  as  there  is with streams; ground-
permits,  the  resulting  resource  allocation  would  be  water  is  diffused  and  availability  can  change  with
optimal  over  the  life  of  the  permit  only  if  there  is  pumping  patterns.  Many  western  states  have  statu-
very  little  change  in  production  systems  and  in  torily  modified  these  groundwater  doctrines  to pro-
communities'  water  use.  In  a  growth  situation,  the  tect  public  interest  [9, 14].  Other  authors  [2, 6]
burden  is  placed  on  the  water  authority  to project  have  pointed  out  economic  shortcomings  of  the
growth  in  water  use  and  to  establish  the  value  in  allocation  systems  used  in  appropriation  doctrine
various  uses  over  time.  This  "solution  by directive"  states and California.
[3]  would  be  extremely  costly,  even  if  value  in use  As  an  alternative,  the  authors  feel  some  features
remained  constant  over time.  Costs  of discovering  all  of a competitive  market can and should be adopted in
such  use  functions  (especially  if  they  change  over  order  to  solve  the water allocation problem over time
time)  are  exorbitant.  Costs  of such knowledge  could  and  space.  2  A "pseudo-market"  could be developed
exceed the  benefits gained  in economic efficiency.  with the administrative  authority serving as a clearing
1The  authors  do  not  wish  to  relegate  the  decision  that  must  be  made  regarding the choice  between private and  public
interest  to  the unworthy  position  of  noneconomic  importance;  i.e.,  economic principles  could  (and  should)  also  be  applied  in
allocation  decisions between  public  and private uses  and within  (and  among)  public  uses. We  are also practical,  however: public
interest,  in many  cases,  involves  dealing with  the Samuelson  type  of "public  good,"  problems  of measurability,  and,  certainly,
involves  the  consideration  of  a  multiple  objective  function.  We  see  some  currently  insurmountable  problems in allocating  the
water  rights  needed  to satisfy  public  interest in a  market  system.  At best, transactions  costs  would only  be higher.  At  worst, a
market  could not and would not operate at all.  This is not to say that economic principles should not be used in the public sector.
We  simply  see less hope  for  establishing  a  market, clearing house operation. Therefore,  at least as a  starting point, it  seems public
interest  should be satisfied  through  a somewhat  arbitrary  (but based  on "educated  guesses"  and  contingencies)  decision process
regarding the water "needed."
11The  prior appropriation  doctrine,  as used in western states, has evolved with state administration to keep the private rights
to  water orderly.  Essentially,  the doctrine  (1)  gives  exclusive  right  to the  first appropriator,  and rights of later appropriators  are
conditional  upon  these  prior  rights;  (2)  makes  all  rights  conditional  upon  beneficial  use;  (3)  permits  water  to  be  used  on
nonriparian  lands  as  well  as  on riparian  lands;  (4)  permits  diversion  of  water  regardless  of  the  diminution  of the  stream; and
(5)  allows loss of the right due to nonuse  [8].
12Bain,  et al.  [2,  p.  666]  have recognized  the need  for marketable  water  rights in California.  They state, "Throughout our
study,  we  have  noted  that  a  striking  attribute  of  the  California  water  industry  is its  consistent  failure  to  develop  continuous
markets  for  water and  water rights.  And this failure,  we have stressed, is in a significant part responsible for failure of agencies in
the industry  to correct  historical misallocations  of  water among  uses, users, and sites of use or to reallocate water when changing
economic conditions made such reallocation  desirable."
60house  or  "arena"  within  which  the  market  could  year  thereafter,  Nc  certificates  would expire  and  Nc
operate.  The administrative  authority would  allow for  certificates  could  be  sold-the latter having  an  effec-
sale  of  transferable  "water  certificates,"  where  each  tive life  of t years. Each  certificate  would provide  an
represented  an  entitlement to a water flow that could  entitlement  to  a  flow  of  water,  Xa,  in  normal
be pumped  from  a particular  sub-region  of a district.  hydrologic  periods.  In periods  of water  supply short-
Each  certificate  would  give  property  right  to  water  ages,  the  entitlement  Xa  would  be  reduced  in
for  some  particular  period  of  time.  During  the time  proportion to the reduction  in overall supply,  Xt.
period,  certificates  would  be  transferable  between  During  the  life  of  these  certificates,  individuals
water users  under supervision  of the  water authority.  could  buy  and/or  lease  certificates  from  other  indi-
At  the end of the period, the certificates would revert  viduals  at  any  price  they  could  negotiate.
1 4 Water
to  the  water  authority  and could  be  offered  for sale  users  would  deal  with  water  in  much  the  same  way
again.  they  deal  with  other  factors  of  production.  This
More  specifically,  the  pseudo-market  system  would  increase  water  use  efficiency  among  uses  and
could  operate  in  the  following  way.  The  authority  users.  Also,  requiring  Nc  permits to expire  each  year
would  issue  certificates  (on  a bid basis)  the first year,  gives  flexibility  to  the  administrative  authority.  In
having  varying  time  periods,  with  a  maximum  of  t  any  particular  year, it could  choose,  for  example,  to
years  (and  others  with  lesser  periods).  All  rights  to  retain  Nr  certificates  in  a  particular  area for  "public
water  available  for private  use in a particular area (Xt,  interest"  or some  other  use.  The  maximum  number
the  total  supply)  would  be  offered  for  sale.  3  To  of  certificates  that  would  be  circulating  in  the
start  the  process,  t different types  of permits would  "market"  at  any  point  in  time  would  be  Nt.  The
be  issued,  each  having  a  different  time  duration  authority  could  cause  the  number  to  be  reduced  to
(measured  in years)  specified  by t-1, t-2, ..., 1.  The  (Nt-Nr)  in  any  one  year,  by  not  reissuing  Nr
proportion  to be issued for each time duration should  certificates,  or by buying certificates in  the "market."
be  1/t.  The  actual amount  of water represented  by a  The  authority  could  protect  "public  interest,"  then,
certificate  would  be  some  common,  known  measure  by  being  an active participant  in the market as well as
Xa.  The  total  number  of  permits  available  the  first  by retaining  Nr certificates  in any given year.
year is given by:  Revenues  from  the  sale  of  certificates  could
provide  funding  for normal  water  management  func-
Xt  tions.  Presently,  these  funds  usually  come  from
Nt= Xa  general  revenues.  The  water  authority  could  also use
revenues to  enhance the  value of water certificates  by
where  reducing  hydrologic  uncertainty  (e.g.,  by  stabilizing
supplies  through  construction  of  water  conservation
Nt = number of permits available  for sale  facilities  and/or  transfer  of  water  from  water-rich
Xt  =  total available supply of water  basins to water-deficient  areas).'  5
Xa =  quantity of water  represented  in a particular  There are,  of course,  many problems  that would
permit.  have  to  be  resolved  in  implementing  the  proposed
system.  Selecting  the time duration,  t, for certificates
The  number  of certificates in each time duration  class  is of particular  interest.  Optimum  life for certificates
(Nc)  is represented  by:  will  depend  on  types  of  use  and  capital  investment
problems  associated  with  these  uses.  Defining  avail-
1  able  supply,  Xt,  in  a particular  area  is also a difficult
c  t  problem,  but  one  with  which  all  allocative  systems
must  deal.  There  is, also,  the problem  of individuals
That  is,  the  authority  could  sell  Nc  certificates  in  attempting  to  control  large  quantities of certificates
each  of the  time duration classes the  first year.  Every  and  manipulate  the  market  price  of  certificates  to
13 The problem  of determining  Xt is not a simple one. Because  of the large number  of nonmoney  valued benefits (and costs)
flowing  from the  water resource,  it  seems a  realistic  starting point  would  be to define Xt as the total quantity  of water available
for  use  to  the  private  sector;  i.e.,  Xt is  the water  supply  remaining after  the many "public  uses"  (like  minimum  stream  flows,
pollution abatement,  salt water  intrusion prevention,  wildlife  preservation,  etc.)  are  subtracted from the total quantity available
(see  footnote 10).
1 4Administratively  controlled  irrigation  water  rental  markets  similar  to  this  exist  in  some  western  states  using  the
appropriation doctrine  and are described in Anderson  [1].
1 5It should be  noted, however,  that the act  allows water to be used on land other than riparian  or overlying land,  as long as
the physical transfer  is in the "public interest."
61their advantage.  This  could  possibly be minimized  by  greater administrative  control.
requiring  the  water  authority  to  monitor certificate  In  the  past,  economic  principles  have  played
transfer.  The authors feel,  however,  gains in economic  almost  no  role  in  water  allocation  in  the  East.  6
efficiency  should  exceed  costs.  Enforcement  costs  Economic  principles  can,  however,  be used  in alloca-
(ensuring  holders  of  certificates  do  not  withdraw  ting  water,  at  least  among  some  uses.  The  authors
more  water  than  the purchased  entitlement)  may be  believe,  especially,  that  economic  principles  can  be
high;  however,  these  costs  would  also  exist  for  the  incorporated  into  water  allocation  among  private
current  Florida  (technical)  allocation  system  as  well  uses,  thereby  improving economic efficiency,  and still
as  for  the  Harl  and  Trelease  approaches.  Further  be  compatible  with  the  broader  "public  interest."
research  needs  to  be  undertaken  to  determine  costs  The  authors  further  believe economists  cannot  stand
and,  in general, to better evaluate the proposal.  by  while  allocative  institutions  are  restructured;
technical  criteria  "or  water  allocation  are  not  suf-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIOS  ficient  for  the  task.  Economists  must  put  forward
Change  is  likely  to  occur  in the water  allocative  practical approaches  and  make  decision  bodies aware
systems  of  most  eastern  states.  In  the  past,  little  of  possibilities  for  improving  the  water  allocation
conflict  arose  among  water  users,  as  water was  not a  process.  Of the three  allocative approaches discussed,
scarce  resource.  Presently,  uses and users of water are  it  is  not  clear  which  is  economically  superior.  Each
many  (public  and  private),  and  competition  for the  has  its  conceptual  strengths and  weaknesses.  Empiri-
supplies  is increasing.  States are  looking  to statutory  cal  research  over  time  will  help  identify  the  best
modification  of their water institutions to resolve the  system. The approach  recommended by the authors is
conflict  among  uses  and  users.  The  trend  is  toward  but one step toward a practical approach.
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